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Abstract 
This chapter explores the role that community forms of social organization play in 
transnational standard setting. We compare the evolution of two cases through time – the 
International Competition Network/Community and the Creative Commons Community. 
Those two transnational communities exhibit quite distinct features and character. The 
International Competition Network has been, from the start, a selective and exclusive 
community bringing together public or quasi-public agencies to buttress an existing and 
dominant agenda. The Creative Commons community, on the other hand, emerged as a 
bottom-up, civil society based social movement, constructed around a challenger agenda with 
an inclusive grassroots philosophy. Our comparison of those two quite different cases does 
not uphold the expectation that different types of transnational communities would show 
distinctive strengths and weaknesses. Rather, we show that each of those communities 
deployed strategies to deal, through time, with their own particular weaknesses and that both 
have been quite successful in their overall objective to strengthen and spread a given standard 
across multiple boundaries.  
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Over the last decades, we have seen a multiplication of transnational standard setting 
initiatives. We live today more than ever in a transnational “world of standards” (Brunsson 
and Jacobsson 2000). Multi-stakeholder arrangements, with a varying combination of public 
and private actors, come together and produce rules or “soft laws” often with a transnational 
ambition if not reach (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006, Graz and Nölke 2008, Tamm 
Hallström and Böstrom 2010, Brunsson, Rasche and Seidl 2011). Transnational standard 
setting entails complex dynamics of standard elaboration and negotiation, standard 
implementation and monitoring. Such transnational dynamics of standardization proliferate 
today and we can follow them in many different domains of economic activity – with an 
impact on production, research and development, marketing and distribution, finance, audit 
and litigation. 
 
Those dynamics involve a variety of actors. Quite striking are the role, presence and clout of 
private actors of different kinds (Graz and Nölke 2008). But even more striking is the fact that 
the strong involvement of many different private actors does not necessarily imply a “retreat 
of the state” (Strange 1996). The idea of the “emergence of private authority” (Hall and 
Biersteker 2002) is partly misleading, at least in the sense that it would suggest a simple 
transfer of governance power from public to private actors. The reality, in fact, is more 
complex and subtle. Quite often, state or government representatives are directly or indirectly 
involved in transnational standard setting – not necessarily as drivers but as actors amongst 
others in a process where consultation, deliberation, confrontation, negotiation all play an 
important role. Hence, governance arrangements associated with transnational standard 
setting generally go beyond simple state-to-state or firm-to-firm interactions. Civil society 
actors (NGOs and social movement activists in particular) have a tendency to target both 
states and firms, together and at the same time, demanding action and responsibility in 
initiatives that go well beyond the borders of any single country (Prakash and Gugerty 2010). 
As a result, governance through standard setting involves a significant blurring of classical 
dividing lines – between the public and the private but also between the national and the 
transnational. Interestingly, transnational standard setting also generally means a partial 
overlapping of the categories of “regulators” and “regulatees”. At least some of those actors 
who will/may have to conform to a particular standard are likely to be involved already in the 
process of standard setting.  
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We suggest, in this chapter, that the complex multi-stakeholder dynamics associated with 
transnational standard setting can be effectively captured through the conceptualization of 
transnational communities. Transnational standard setting, as a particular form of 
transnational governance, both generates and is facilitated by the structuration of transnational 
communities (Djelic and Quack 2010). Typologies of governance forms have tended to 
associate communities with primary grouping based on solidarity (Crouch 2005, Jessop and 
Ngai-Ling 2006). We argue, in this chapter, that communities based on territory and physical 
proximity, not to mention direct interaction, constitute only one particular form of 
communities amongst others. In modern societies, forms of communal organization have 
evolved. They need no longer be based on kinship and propinquity. They can be structured 
around a shared cognitive, epistemic, practice or value base and/or through the mutual 
orientation to a common project. A collective “imagined identity” emerges in the process that 
translates into strategies and actions on the ground. In analytical terms, communities differ 
from other forms of governance (markets, hierarchies or networks) in the nature of  their 
coordination.  While markets are coordinated through exchange, hierarchies function through 
command and control while networks are stabilized through multi-directional negotiation. 
Communities, on the other hand, are coordinated through conscious common orientation and 
shared identity (Morgan 2001; Djelic and Quack 2010; Mayntz 2010). Yet, empirically, such 
communities often overlap with and develop in parallel to organizations or networks (Mayntz 
2010). The line separating, in particular, social networks as interconnected nodes from 
communities as defined above may sometimes be thin and fluid and we might often encounter 
hybrid arrangements (Crouch 2005). As a consequence, transnational communities as social 
groups emerging from mutual interactions across national boundaries, oriented around a 
common project and or “imagined” identity, can be difficult to grasp empirically. 
Nevertheless, as we argue in this chapter, a focus on transnational communities is helpful in 
order to explore the neglected cognitive and cultural dimension of transnational standard 
setting. 
 
Building upon earlier work on transnational governance, we explore in this chapter the 
interplay between processes of transnational standard setting and processes of transnational 
community building (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006; Djelic and Quack 2010). We 
illustrate these processes and their interplay through the comparative analysis of two 
empirical cases that each exemplify a distinct pattern of transnational community 
development. A first case is the transnational setting of standards for the regulation of 
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competition and the parallel structuration and development of a transnational community – 
embodied in particular in the International Competition Network (ICN). The second case is 
the development and dissemination of Creative Commons licenses by non-profit 
organizations, here also paralleled and sustained by the structuration of associated 
transnational communities. In both cases, we find that transnational processes of standard 
setting are co-evolving with transnational processes of community building. Transnational 
standard setting triggers and fosters processes of community building beyond national 
boundaries. But transnational communities are also themselves important facilitators of 
transnational standard setting initiatives. In particular, those communities contribute, over 
time, to the alignment of the cognitive and normative orientations of members. Hence, they 
can help stabilize and ground fragile standard setting projects by turning them into behavioral 
patterns applicable and legitimate in many diverse and distant locales. In the conclusion, we 
try to learn from those similarities but also from differences between those two cases, 
indicating directions for further research.  
 
 
Transnational Communities and Standard Setting  
We live in a (transnational) “golden era of regulation”, characterized by the multiplication of 
rules that reach over and beyond national boundaries (Levi-Faur and Jordana 2005). Our well-
entrenched national “rules of law” increasingly have to confront the progress of a 
transnational “law of rules” (Djelic 2011). Those “rules” are often described as “soft laws”. 
The difference between “hard” and “soft” law lies essentially in the fact that “soft law lacks 
the possibility of legal sanctions…and hence is not legally binding” (Mörth 2004:1). Various 
forms of so-called “soft law” become consequential and effective through non-legal 
mechanisms of inducement and persuasion, and yet, not infrequently, “soft laws” could be a 
first step towards and an input for “hard” law-making (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006: 
377, Quack 2007). 
 
Standards as “soft laws” 
“Soft laws” can take different forms – principles, guidelines, directives, codes of conduct, 
“white books”, best practice and evaluation schemes, or standards. Typically, the term 
“standards” is used to identify highly formalized sets of rules but with a high degree of 
specificity – in contrast to, on the one hand, broader and more general principles and, on the 
other hand, more informal guidelines or best practices (Ahrne and Brunsson 2006: 82; 
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Braithwaite and Drahos 2000: 20). Still, the lines separating these different types of non-
legally binding rules can be rather fuzzy and they become even more so if we look at standard 
setting as a process rather than at standards as outcomes.  
 
This fuzziness translates into significant variability when it comes to definitions. On the one 
hand, ISO proposes a rather narrow definition of a standard as  
a document, established by consensus and approved by a recognized body, that 
provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for 
activities or their results, aimed at the achievement of the optimum degree of order in a 
given context (ISO/IEC 2004).
1
 
 
On the other hand, Brunsson and Jacobsson call for a broader and more encompassing 
understanding where standards are “pieces of general advice offered to a large number of 
potential adopters” (Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000: 2). Drawing on Timmermans and Epstein 
(2010: 71), we position ourselves somewhere in between. We propose to focus on standard 
setting rather than standards. We understand standard setting as a process of constructing and 
implementing agreed-upon rules, usually backed by some external body, with the aim of 
creating uniformities across time and space between different localized activities. Standard 
setting understood in this sense can also encompass attempts to formulate guidelines, codes of 
conduct or to work out best practices as intermediary steps in the process of formulating and 
implementing standards.  
 
The standards that emerge from complex production processes, often at a transnational level, 
in principle tend to be voluntary. Some of these standards, such as quality and technological 
standards, aim at better coordination of economic activity in global markets. Others strive 
instead to build social and environmental concerns into the constitution of markets, as in the 
case of standards relating to labour rights, human rights, corruption and ethics or 
environmental protection. In order for standards to be effective, they have to be associated 
with a whole range of mechanisms and processes that target adoption on the ground across 
and beyond local differences and contexts – norms of transparency and accountability, 
incentive systems, persuasion, socialization and monitoring mechanisms if not more coercive 
tools such as exclusion from access to resources, markets, benefits or even banishment from a 
valued community or “league”. To understand how and why some standards develop a quasi-
                                                   
1 It is clear that this definition has become itself a “standard” for the definition of standards. It has 
been appropriated word for word by most national or transnational normalizing or standardizing 
organizations. 
6 
binding character and others do not, the process perspective needs to be broadened beyond the 
defining phase to subsequent phases of diffusion and implementation. Botzem and Dobusch 
(forthcoming) argue that such an approach to standard setting should grant particular attention 
to reciprocal interactions between standard formation and standard diffusion and how those 
two stages generate different forms of legitimacy. Processes of legitimacy building around 
particular standards are likely to invoke the participation of a variety of groups and interests 
that often started from a national base (Black 2008; Quack 2010). These processes will also 
contribute in time to the structuration and stabilization of those same groups into a broader 
collective – and in time community – with a transnational reach and scope. 
 
Transnational Communities and their Role 
When it comes to transnational standardization, transnational communities can play different 
roles. We identify a number of analytically distinct roles that can combine in different ways. 
Firstly, transnational communities, particularly in the form of epistemic or practice 
communities, can be initiators of formal standard setting processes. Cutting pragmatically 
across entrenched perceptions and interests, whether public or private, transnational 
communities can draw on diverse pools of knowledge and expertise and bring them together 
in a unique manner. Secondly, transnational communities can contribute to the creation of a 
transnational public problem space, where issues in need of standardization can be identified 
and agreed upon. Creating and framing a common problem is clearly an important first step 
towards collective mobilization and action. Thirdly, transnational communities can mobilize 
collective action to support transnational standard setting projects but also to help diffuse 
standards and convince local actors to adopt them. By addressing diffuse and unorganized 
actors as potential users and adopters, standard setters often galvanize processes of 
community formation among previously isolated actors, which in turn positively feedback on 
diffusion and adoption rates. Fourthly, transnational communities shape and delineate a public 
arena where a multiplicity of actors can actively search for a common solution or standard. In 
so far as communities nurture discussion and deliberation, or provide social space for 
contained contention and conflicts over standard setting they structure public arenas where 
compromise solutions to complex standard setting problems can emerge. Fifthly, and partly as 
a consequence of their previous roles, transnational communities can over time foster 
preference transformation in some or all of their members; this can be the result of learning, 
mutual adjustment, socialization or inducement by threat of exclusion. As a consequence they 
can contribute to the progressive convergence of preferences between participants coming 
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from many different national institutional and cultural backgrounds and this throughout the 
process of standard setting. Finally, transnational communities can have a profound impact in 
standard setting as they exert their capacity for informal sanctioning of and social control over 
their members. The probability of “conversion” and real adoption will increase through peer 
pressure, the sharing of information, and more formal socialization mechanisms. Ultimately, 
the strongest source of sanctioning is the threat of exclusion from or refusal of admission into 
an existing community – particularly if this community is associated with significant 
resources and/or legitimacy.  
 
While it is clear that structured transnational communities are likely to be powerful facilitators 
of transnational standard setting, a partial reverse influence can also be assumed. 
Transnational standard setting is likely to involve and invoke processes of community 
formation at a transnational level. A successful standardization process is bound to come 
together with the stabilization, deepening and broadening of one or several transnational 
communities. Those communities may even construct and crystallize their collective 
“imagined identity” through and around the standard setting project itself.  
 
We conceptualize transnational communities as being actively constructed and shaped by 
people with multiple group affiliations interacting across societal and national borders. This 
conceptualization makes it possible to envision different patterns of community formation, 
development and maintenance, as well as community decline. We distinguish three 
dimensions that are likely to influence the development of transnational communities, and 
hence could serve to structure a typology of transnational communities (Table 1). A first 
dimension is the nature of the goals fostering community building, which itself reflects the 
relative power of members in a given regulatory field. Transnational communities can start 
out from a small base of powerful actors with the goal to enlist others in following their 
proposed (and existing) standards. Yet, transnational communities can also emerge through a  
challenger project where less resourceful actors target the development of an alternative 
standard. A second dimension refers to the nature of the rules governing access for new 
members. While elite communities apply selective and exclusionary rules when it comes to 
access, grassroots communities follow a more inclusive mode of community building. A third 
dimension concerns the nature and the mix of actors involved in community building. The 
range would go here from transnational communities formed exclusively of state or quasi-
state actors to transnational communities made up of only private actors.  In private 
8 
transnational communities, a distinction also needs to be made between those communities 
made up exclusively of powerful, often organizational, business actors and those communities 
that are constructed through the aggregation of multiple individual or organizational actors 
drawn from civil societies. Naturally, somewhere between the different extremes we have the 
possibility of many different hybrids. 
 
Table 1 – Dimensions of Transnational Community Development 
DIMENSION 1: Nature of Goals/Power  Enlisting       -------------------------------         Challenging 
DIMENSION 2: Mode of Access Elite-exclusionary   ---------       Grassroots-inclusionary 
DIMENSION 3: Nature of Actors State   --------     Business      ----------           Civil Society 
 
In theory, different combinations are possible that would suggest different patterns of 
transnational community development. Table 2 identifies the analytically most relevant 
combinations along those three dimensions and moves us towards a typology of transnational 
community development
2
. Transnational communities consisting of powerful actors in a given 
field of governance aiming at enlisting other actors to follow their standards are likely to 
employ a selective if not exclusionary mode to recruit new members. Such communities can 
consist of regulatory state agencies of a few powerful countries aiming to enlist regulatory 
agencies from other parts of the world; they also can be formed by business actors aiming to 
enlist others of a similar kind to produce standards as a “club common good”. In both cases, 
the mode of access is selective if not exclusionary – members of the emerging community 
recruit their peers and exert strong control about who is able to join. In contrast, transnational 
communities that are formed with the goal of challenging dominant rules in a given field of 
governance are likely to follow a grassroots approach which is more inclusionary and targets 
a broad variety of actors from civil society or mixed background (state as well as business).  
 
 
 
Table 2 –Typology of Transnational Communities Development 
 
                                                   
2
 This typology elaborates further on a distinction drawn in earlier work that contrasted a bottom-up approach by 
which a transnational community is built up and stabilized through multiple and repeated interactions between 
members of diverse national or local communities with a top-down approach according to which a small, 
generally elite, transnational group tries to disseminate its particular project or agenda to audiences in multiple 
nations and localities (Djelic and Quack forthcoming).  
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 Goals 
Enlisting Challenging 
 
Mode of 
access 
Elite/Exclusionary TOP DOWN 
(State / Business) 
--- 
Grassroots/Inclusionary --- BOTTOM UP 
(Civil society/mixed) 
 
Elsewhere (Djelic and Quack forthcoming) we have suggested that different types of 
transnational communities might have their specific strengths and weaknesses. Transnational 
communities consisting of powerful actors following an elite approach with a top-down 
trajectory are likely to constitute more unified actors in terms of standard-setting. Yet, they 
might lack the ability for broad mobilization on implementation, monitoring and control. 
Transnational communities challenging dominant rules and recruiting members via an 
inclusionary approach, often following a bottom-up trajectory, might find it difficult to come 
to a unified position on rule-making. Yet, they will have a greater capacity to mobilize varied 
resources and collective action. One way for those different types of communities to deal with 
their respective weaknesses, we furthermore suggested, would be to develop complementary 
strategies. 
 
In order to examine the value of this typology for the analysis of the co-evolution between 
transnational standard setting and transnational community building, we now turn to a more 
detailed analysis of two case studies. The Competition/ICN and Copyleft/Creative Commons 
cases were chosen because they represent a good mix of striking differences and parallel roles 
in processes of transnational standard setting. The communities involved in each case display 
significantly different characteristics with respect to their goals, their modes of access as well 
as the nature of membership. The International Competition Community (ICN) consists 
predominantly of officials from governmental or transgovernmental competition agencies 
reaching out periodically to small numbers of private actors (non-governmental advisors – 
NGAs). By contrast, the Creative Commons community counts a majority of non-state actors, 
essentially lawyers and civil society groups. While the former developed out of and in 
interaction with a transnational network of governmental agencies, the latter generated and 
evolved in tight connection to an international non-profit organization with national affiliates. 
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Finally, while the former started out with the objective of fostering convergence at the global 
level around common understandings and practices, the latter set out to develop a private 
license, both as an alternative to, and as a critique of, existing international and national laws.  
 
Our two cases are nicely contrasting on all three dimensions, and therefore one could expect 
different trajectories reflecting distinct strengths and weaknesses. Still, in spite of those 
striking differences, the emergent transnational communities in both cases turned out to 
perform, through time, quite similar functions. They both significantly contributed to the 
elaboration, diffusion and adoption of shared standards. In order to do so, they both relied on 
softer mechanisms of persuasion and socialization. And in the end, they both came to allow 
for a certain degree of flexibility and local adaptability – combining formal standard setting 
with a degree of  “informed divergence”.  
 
 
The International Competition Network (ICN) and Standard Setting for the Regulation 
of Competition 
The International Competition Network (ICN) was officially launched in October 2001. 
Thirteen national antitrust agencies and the European Union competition agency were its 
founding members.
3
 From the start, membership was both open and restricted to all national, 
regional or multi-national antitrust agencies. Numbers rose fast and, by the spring of 2002, the 
ICN already had fifty members. Today, the ICN has close to a global reach – 99 jurisdictions 
are represented that together account for more than 90% of world GDP (ICN 2010). 
 
From Transnational Network Based on Common Interest… 
The 2001 Founding Memorandum defined the ICN as 
a project oriented, consensus‐based, informal network of antitrust agencies that will 
address antitrust enforcement and policy issues of common interest (ICN 2001) 
 
As a network, the ICN has three main characteristics – it is virtual, inclusive and open in a 
selective manner. First, the ICN is a virtual network – with no offices, legal status, employees 
or even budget. The ICN does not have a geographic hub or permanent secretariat. A Steering 
Group of 15 members sets agendas and work plans, identifying priorities that then have to be 
approved by members during the yearly conference. The work itself is done within ad hoc and 
                                                   
3 The thirteen countries were: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, South 
Africa, South Korea, the United Kingdom, United States and Zambia. 
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temporary working groups that each focus on a particular issue and meet rarely, relying 
instead on modern technologies. Second, the ICN is an inclusive network, based on voluntary 
membership. Any national or multi-national competition authority can easily become a 
member without having to fit any specific criteria. At the same time, though, it is important to 
note that throughout the last ten years, the Steering group of the ICN has been and remains 
dominated by representatives from the more established antitrust agencies – with an 
overwhelming weight of developed countries.
4
 Finally, the ICN is a network that is selectively 
open. While membership in the full sense of the term is strictly restricted to competition 
agencies, the ICN keeps a number of doors open to other parties interested in or connected to 
issues of competition and antitrust. In principle, the ICN wants to “maximize cooperation with 
non-governmental antitrust experts from the relevant international, industry, consumer, legal, 
economic and academic communities” (Ugarte 2002). In practice, this means that member 
agencies and in particular members of the Steering Group can invite non-governmental 
experts to the annual ICN conferences or to working group events. 
 
From the start, the central focus of the ICN transnational network was competition – “all 
competition all the time” (Finckenstein 2003). Initially, the ICN emerged as an initiative to 
foster dialogue amongst antitrust officials and beyond. Ultimately, though, a more ambitious 
objective was to create, deepen and spread, worldwide, a “culture” of antitrust and 
competition – which, as key actors recognized, was part of a “broader mosaic” and came 
together with a culture of “markets” (Kolasky 2002: 3-5). A forum for dialogue, exchange and 
collaborative work could generate in time a common culture around competition policy. It 
would also build up progressively a dense social and cognitive space and, hopefully, beyond 
simply the network, a real “community of interest” (Finckenstein 2002).  
 
The structuring logic behind the ICN was to start with the creation of an inclusive, tight and in 
fact exclusionary network of insiders and to combine and articulate it, progressively, with a 
number of weaker external networks reaching out to important constituencies, both nationally 
and transnationally. Such a combination would be likely to increase the scale and scope of the 
double effort at transnational culture-building and transnational culture-spreading. That one of 
                                                   
4 In 2008, the list of countries represented in the Steering Group was quite telling and not very 
different from the list of founding members: US (2 representatives), UK, Mexico, Japan, Canada, 
Russia, Brazil, Australia, Korea, Germany, Turkey, Netherlands, France, EU, South Africa, Italy, 
Switzerland). 
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the three original working groups focused on “advocacy” says enough about the centrality of 
that double project. The Advocacy working group defined its mission in the following way: 
Competition advocacy refers to those activities conducted by the competition authority 
related to the promotion of a competitive environment for economic activities by 
means of non-enforcement mechanisms, mainly through its relationships with other 
governmental entities and by increasing public awareness of the benefits of 
competition (AWG 2002). 
 
The Advocacy working group (AWG) began with a systematic comparison of the situation of 
member agencies and with an exploration of their embeddedness in unique national 
institutional contexts. The AWG sent a questionnaire to each ICN member to build up the 
empirical base for such a comparison and exploration. The first report was presented during 
the 2002 Naples conference. This report underscored different perceptions on the importance 
of advocacy in each member agency as well as variation in the types of obstacles and 
challenges that member agencies faced in their competition advocacy activities. Following 
this analysis, the AWG defined its mission as “recommending best practices to ICN members 
and providing them with information to support their advocacy tasks” with a consideration for 
the variability of national conditions and local politics (AWG 2002). 
 
…to Transnational Community of Governance 
While building itself up progressively as a “community of interest”, the International 
Competition Network was in fact from the start doing much more. With hindsight, it is 
obvious that the structuring of the ICN through the last ten years has largely contributed to the 
framing of competition and antitrust as a public problem space with transnational scope and 
reach. The ICN has been actively involved in shaping and delineating a transnational public 
arena around those issues. It has played the role, if we can use this image, of a central 
“magnetic” forum – attracting and involving, around its member base, a multiplicity of other 
actors with an interest or a stake in competition and antitrust.  
 
The ICN does not define itself as a regulatory actor - while many of its members could be 
defined in this way within their respective jurisdictions. Still, its role and impact since 2001 
show the progress of an ambition that goes well beyond dialogue, information and exchange. 
Members of the Steering group are conscious of – and claim in fact – such broadening of their 
ambitions through time. From a transnational network, the ICN has transformed into a 
“transnational community of interest” and progressively it has even been imposing itself as a 
highly active “transnational community of governance”. The ICN is increasingly targeting, in 
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its various forms of official and less official communication, a real transformative impact on 
competition regulation both nationally and transnationally.  
 
Transnationally, the ICN increasingly sees its role as contributing to best practice definition 
and standard setting. It is, in other words, increasingly claiming an identity as a “transnational 
community of governance”. The ICN has the capacity and the resources to mobilize widely 
and broadly – if only because of its significant reach – around different projects targeting the 
elaboration of partial best practices and standards. The different adhoc and temporary working 
groups are particularly well designed for this kind of purpose. As David Lewis, then 
Chairman of the ICN Steering group, said in his introductory remarks to the 2009 Zurich 
annual conference, “we (the ICN) are clearly in the business of making „soft law‟ and this is 
what we must continue” (Lewis 2009). „Soft law‟, he made clear is qualitatively different 
from „hard law‟ – and not just a “less binding, pale version” of it (see also Mörth 2006). The 
ICN does not follow a logic of constraint or coercion. “Soft law”, Lewis continues,  
is rooted in consensus rather than majority; in persuasion through shared experience 
rather than coercion; in understanding and celebrating differences rather than 
suppressing them (Lewis 2009).  
 
Even though the ICN defines itself today as a transnational community of governance and is 
thus, as such, targeting some form of transnational standard setting, it also sets itself the 
objective of having a local or national impact. It hopes to do that through two different but 
complementary paths – that follow respectively a trickle-down and a trickle-up trajectory 
(Djelic and Quack 2003). First, members of the Steering group are hoping for a trickle-down 
impact. ICN work should come to reflect upon national competition regimes in a direct way, 
through the involvement of representatives from member agencies. The idea is not that 
members comply with recommended practices right from the outset. Rather, the hope is that 
they “will consider them as aspirational goals in the context of evolving national competition 
frameworks” (Finckenstein 2003: 13). Members are, in other words, in no obligation to ensure 
that domestic laws reflect ICN guidelines and recommendations. Each agency will decide 
whether and how to implement the recommendations – adapting its strategies to local politics 
and constraints (Fingleton 2009b: 21). Still, members of the ICN Steering committee expect, 
on a practical level, that “as best practice proposals are acted upon by members, a natural peer 
influence will come to bear on other jurisdictions to do the same” (Finckenstein 2002:4). The 
ICN Steering group hopes that such trickle-down impact will combine with a trickle-up one. 
By opening the network of insiders to representatives of relevant and important 
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constituencies, the Steering group wants to build bridges with those constituencies. Non-
governmental experts are co-opted and involved in the work of the ICN at many different 
stages with the idea that they will then become themselves important agents of the fight for 
competition and antitrust in their respective constituencies. Once a number of local 
constituencies – or parts thereof – become champions of competition and antitrust, they can 
push those ideas back up at the national or regional governmental level and thus reinforce the 
impact and influence of competition authorities.  
 
Hence, throughout its evolution over the last ten years, the ICN has emerged as an 
increasingly significant and powerful “transnational community of governance”. As such, it 
has been fulfilling most of the functions such communities are expected to fulfill (Djelic and 
Quack 2010). The ICN has shaped a transnational problem space and interactive arenas 
around the issue of competition. It has played a role in the mobilization around competition 
regulation. It has directly contributed to the setting of rules and standards and to the 
monitoring of their implementation. It has helped transform preferences along the way and 
has certainly exerted a certain kind of social control over its members. 
 
While the ICN was progressively moving away from being a simple transnational network to 
becoming a “transnational community of interest” and in time even a “transnational 
community of governance”, the various steps it took were not always easy ones. Members of 
the ICN, and particularly members of the Steering group, have had to realize in the process 
the complexities of transnational “soft governance”. And while they persisted in their ultimate 
ambition of being an important actor of transnational governance for competition and its 
regulation, they have had to dampen a bit early hopes of easy convergence and 
homogenization. As Lewis recently acknowledged, “the evidence is that „best practices‟, even 
in relatively uncontroversial areas, usually have to be tailored to national circumstances and 
so implementation will always be uneven at best” (Lewis 2009). The Steering group appears 
to have come to the realization that “convergence is not possible” and its members are now 
talking about “informed divergence” instead, as a less ambitious, more realistic but also more 
complex goal (Fingleton 2009a: 6). “Informed divergence”, according to them, implies to 
identify the “nature and sources of divergence and to understand and respect the divergent 
underlying rationale” in each national jurisdiction (Fingleton 2009b: 27).  
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This ”softer” stance, though, should not blind us to the consequential politics and power 
issues that are at work here. As members of the Steering Committee underscore a “culture of 
antitrust” goes together with a ”culture of markets”. As such, the project of the ICN belongs 
to and has been integrated from the start in the broader wave of neoliberalism that has 
diffused across many shores (Campbell and Pedersen 2001; Dezalay and Garth 2002; 
Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002; Djelic 2006). The structuration of a transnational 
community around competition and antitrust would not have been even thinkable without the 
striking missionary activism of American (but also European) competition authorities that 
took place from the 1990s on. Between 1990 and 1998 only, American Antitrust Authorities 
(Antitrust Department, DoJ and Federal Trade Commission) alone sent 390 expert missions 
around the world to help countries across all regions set up a national competition regime. 
They also provided training in the United States for around 300 foreign (future) experts 
(Djelic and Kleiner 2006). Effectively, this suggests that what might really be at stake is not 
the convergence of many different standards but the progressive and “soft” imposition of a 
certain model of competition – a standard pioneered in the United States and relayed to a 
degree by the European Union. Interestingly, those background politics and power issues have 
reflected less than could be expected on internal debates within the ICN. Regularly, a few 
members within the ICN worry that it should be made “clear that all members of the 
competition family are the actors of the initiative and that they all play an equal role” 
(Tesauro 2002). But this is as far as it seems to go – softly expressed worries addressed by the 
formal re-assurance that “of course, consistently sound antitrust enforcement policy cannot be 
defined and decreed for others by the United States, not that you would presume to do such a 
thing” (Kolasky 2002: 3). 
 
 
Creative Commons and Standardized Copyright Licenses for a Digital Commons
5
  
In 2001, a group of US legal academics founded Creative Commons (CC) as an American 
non-profit organization. In the context of the TRIPS (trade-related aspects of intellectual 
property rights) agreement negotiations, the US media industries ran a powerful lobbying 
campaign to extend copyright in order to protect their traditional business model. This new 
organization instead was targeting a middle ground between the internet practice of freely 
sharing content and the traditional “all rights reserved” setting that copyright law provides6. 
                                                   
5
 Details of the following section are, unless stated otherwise, based on Dobusch and Quack (2010a). 
6
 http://creativecommons.org/about [accessed: 25 April 2011]] 
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The Creative Commons organization set itself the objective to develop standardized licenses. 
Those licenses would enable creative individuals and organizations to easily grant copyright 
permissions to freely copy, distribute and recombine contents, thereby contributing to a digital 
commons. By 2010, Creative Commons had developed into an international organizational 
network with more than 100 affiliates. The licenses it has produced have been “ported”, i.e. 
translated and legally adapted to local requirements, in about 70 different jurisdictions. 
Cautious estimates of the total number of works licensed under Creative Commons worldwide 
added up to about 350 million by then.
7
 
 
From Emergent Epistemic Community to Organizational Capacities 
Creative Commons was not born out of nowhere. The idea of fostering a public commons for 
all kinds of contents had been nurtured during the late 1990s by a community of legal 
academics in the United States (Dobusch and Quack 2010a). The TRIPS agreement in 1994 
and the US Copyright Term Extension Act in 1998 spurred this group to react in critical terms 
to the extension of copyright terms. Similarity in professional backgrounds was certainly an 
important foundation for the emergence of a community around this critical opposition. Of 
equal importance, though, were shared norms and the commitment to a common policy 
project. In so far as this group was a network of professionals and opinion leaders “with 
recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to 
policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” they constituted what Haas 
(1992) calls an “epistemic community”. 
 
This epistemic community significantly contributed to the framing of a public policy 
argument that denounced existing copyright regulations based on “all rights reserved” as 
highly problematic. The extension of copyright terms was presented as socially undesirable 
because it hampered a free use of the internet for research, educational and cultural purposes. 
Founding members of the Creative Commons organization published articles and books that 
denounced the shortcomings and problems of the dominant copyright doctrine (Lessig 1999, 
2001). In 2003, one member of this community, Stanford law professor Lawrence Lessig, 
challenged the constitutionality of the US Copyright Term Extension Act in the Supreme 
Court. Acting then as the legal advisor in the trial of an online publisher of public domain 
texts, his plea was, however, not heard. Several members of the community attempted to 
                                                   
7 See http://wiki.creativecommons.org/Metrics [accessed: 7 January 2011] 
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convince policy-makers of the advantages of securing tax deductions for individuals who 
would be willing to relinquish their property rights
8
 in texts. 
 
In their role as public intellectuals, these members of the community called on a form of 
“cultural environmentalism” to protect the public domain (the “cultural commons”) from all 
types of infringements (Boyle 2006). They put forward the notion of a “free culture”  to 
overcome outmoded doctrines of copyrights (Lessig 2004). While the epistemic community 
was originally based in the US, the statements and publications of its members rapidly 
diffused through old and new media to like-minded people in other countries. Progressively, a 
transnational public problem space emerged. Virtual arenas were established and actors from 
different backgrounds became mutually aware of each other. They engaged in common 
discussions and became gradually oriented towards a common policy project. 
 
With the Creative Commons organization, the founding members in fact had set up an 
infrastructure that provided a home for ongoing discussions on digital commons. Their vision 
built on principles developed by a larger and more established practice community and social 
movement in the open source software sector (Weber 2004). In the process, they emphasized 
the broader applicability of the open source licensing approach to all kinds of creative works. 
In the words of Lawrence Lessig, Creative Commons was founded  
“… to produce copyright licenses that artists, authors, educators, and researchers could use to 
announce to the world the freedoms that they want their creative work to carry. If the default 
rule of copyright is “all rights reserved,” the express meaning of a Creative Commons license is 
that only “some rights [are] reserved.”9 
 
The Creative Commons organization was established to provide a “brand” for the Creative 
Commons copyright licenses. Its purpose was also to raise funds and create the administrative 
capacities necessary for the realization of the community‟s vision of a “digital commons”. 
Financial support came from law centers at Universities and public foundations. Since the 
early days, the board of directors of the Creative Commons organization (with a strong 
representation of lawyers) has worked together with a technical advisory board (with a strong 
presence of computer scientists) and an audit committee. Creative Commons started as a 
rather minimalist organization with only a few staff members employed
10
. The first main task 
was to develop a legal toolbox: machine-readable license modules and corresponding 
                                                   
8 Interview with Lawrence Lessig 2007. 
9 Interview with Lawrence Lessig 2007. 
10 Ten years later, the organizational chart lists 41 staff members (20 full-time, 10 part-time paid staff 
and unpaid) (http://mirrors.creativecommons.org/cc-org-chart.pdf [accessed: 13 January 2011]). 
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iconographic markers that could be combined to form different standardized copyright 
licenses. In December 2002, the first versions of Creative Commons licenses were issued in 
the US. 
 
Towards Transnationalization – of Communities and of Organization 
Transnationalization originated mainly from bottom-up initiatives and queries. Soon after the 
first launch of the licenses in the US, foreign lawyers and experts contacted Creative 
Commons to obtain the right to port the licenses into their own national legal systems. These 
foreign contacts often belonged or were inspired by the free/open source software movement. 
As early as the spring of 2003, Creative Commons opened an international office in Berlin 
with a view to coordinate the activities of volunteers in different countries. Creative 
Commons had become a model for audiences in many different countries searching for 
alternatives to the existing copyright
11
. Creative Commons‟ approach to transnationalization 
of their model combined community building with the setting up of an international 
organizational network. This approach emerged out of a series of ad hoc decisions and 
personal interactions with activists pursuing a similar cause in other countries. Among those 
foreign nodes, a number had been socialised into the Creative Commons spirit through 
participation in seminars run by some of the founding members in major American law 
schools.
12
 
 
The Board of Directors of Creative Commons encouraged like-minded individuals with 
professional legal credentials and a reputation in the copyright debate to become so-called 
“project leads” in their country. These project leads were typically critical copyright lawyers 
or experts in open source software with a base in public universities or research institutes. The 
latter then became “affiliate institutions” in the Creative Commons organizational network. 
Creative Commons signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the affiliate 
institution with the intent to “work together to advance public education, access and the use of 
knowledge by translating and legally adapting the Creative Commons licenses and/or 
                                                   
11
 Braithwaite and Drahos (2000: 539) highlight that modelling can be a “potent weapon” for 
relatively weak actors because it involves learning based on conceptions of practical actions - actions 
which pursued by a large number of people can make a change. 
12
 The project leads, for example, of two pioneer countries – Japan and Finland – had been at the same 
Seminar at Stanford where they met Lawrence Lessig. Ronaldo Lemos, the Brazilian project lead, first 
came into contact with Creative Commons at Harvard‟s Berkman Center. Those early socialization 
opportunities hence played a big role in the transnationalization of the community (Dobusch and 
Quack 2010a). 
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amendments to the Creative Commons licenses … and to explain the mission and the purpose 
of Creative Commons.”13 Restrictions and constraints stated in the MOU related exclusively 
to the use of Creative Commons as a trademark and to the formal license porting processes. 
The organization of local events, funding or thematic priorities were up to the discretion of 
local organizations. Hence, they could take into consideration and adapt to the different local 
and national social and political contexts. 
 
A close look at the individuals and at the affiliate organizations involved in translating the 
licenses shows that transnationalization during the first years (2003-2005) was fueled 
predominantly by the absorption into the epistemic community of critical open source and 
internet lawyers from outside the US. The pre-existence in a given country of a free/open 
source software movement was then and there a clear accelerator of license porting. Even 
though not all lawyers involved were copyright experts, legal professionals clearly dominated 
the transnationalizing epistemic community during the early expansion phase of Creative 
Commons.  
 
Once licenses were in place, the activities of Creative Commons and its affiliates expanded 
from developing legal tools (which still continued in the form of upgrading and revising 
license versions in response to feedback from users) to a wider set of tasks related to public 
advocacy and user mobilization. For example, Creative Commons engaged in courting well-
known artists or widely recognized public institutions to adopt their copyright licenses as one 
strategy to promote them as a standard. At the local and national level, project leads and 
affiliate organizations became contact-points for loosely coupled individuals and practice 
groups from many different fields of cultural production (i.e. music, education, public 
archives) and provided opportunities for them to engage in shared projects of collaborative 
production of digital content under the CC license standard. Creative Commons therefore also 
gave rise to the formation of new collective actors within the field of digital production, as 
well as it shaped the common identity of these actors. Project leads in jurisdictions which 
joined the network after 2005 often came from civil society or educational fields thereby 
reaching out to potential users from the start. 
 
                                                   
13
 Template of a memorandum of understanding, see 
http://wiki.creativecommons.org/images/9/9f/CCMOU.pdf [accessed: 13 January 2011] 
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Advocacy, publicizing and mobilizing quickly yielded fruit. The use of Creative Commons 
licenses increased exponentially after their release
14
 with the double effect of enhancing 
attractiveness to future potential users and bringing many new individuals and practice groups 
to the Creative Commons community. This clear trend towards a broadening of the 
community was partly fuelled by the building up, globally, of social movements targeting the 
protection of civil rights to information on the internet and promoting a “digital and cultural 
environmentalism.” This translated in the dynamism of online discussions on various mailing 
lists and public events associated with the Creative Commons community.  
 
While the multiplication of practice and user groups was instrumental for Creative Commons 
to prosper, it also made management structures and functions much more complex in the still 
young organization. Local affiliates and user activists asked for more participation and 
decision-rights in the organization while Board members like Lawrence Lessig emphasized 
that developing CC licenses as a brand required “expertise rather than democratic 
motivation”15. In 2005, the Board initiated an organizational overhaul at both the international 
and national levels. At the international level, Creative Commons actually split into two parts 
when it hived off “iCommons” in November 2005 as a separate legal and organizational 
entity headquartered in London. At the same time, the internationalization project in Berlin 
was renamed Creative Commons International (CCi) and remained as “just an office” of the 
US non-profit organization.  
 
At the national level, Creative Commons introduced a differentiation between legal and public 
project leads. The legal lead continued to provide legal expertise and work in close 
cooperation with the CCi office in Berlin on both license porting and license development. 
The public project lead, on the other hand, was meant to take over all the “community work” 
– above all organizing events, marketing the licenses, and networking among and across 
different groups of license users. Legal and public project leads could be based in the same or 
in different affiliate organizations. While this division of labor was implemented in most 
jurisdictions, ICommons as a separate organization never lived up to the expectations of its 
founders. After having organized iSummits in Rio de Janeiro in 2006, in Dubrovnik in 2007 
and in Sapporo in 2008, it silently suspended its activities after four years of existence. Today, 
                                                   
14
 By 2009 Creative Commons had become the standard license for open content in the internet, as 
evidenced by the move of Wikipedia from an open source software license to the use of Creative 
Commons licenses in the same year. 
15
 Interview with Lawrence Lessig 2007. 
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it only continues to operate as a webpage for the posting of events while debates on more 
democratic participation in Creative Commons periodically reemerge on mailing lists and in 
other virtual and public arenas.  
 
Creative Commons is therefore a community that has evolved, over the past ten years, from a 
small mostly national epistemic community into a transnational community of interconnected 
communities (of practice, episteme or interest). In many respects, it seems to be able to 
benefit from its internal plurality and diversity. It has clearly become a transnational 
community with an impact on governance. It plays, as such, different roles. It is involved in 
the framing of public problem spaces and arenas. It contributes to the structuring and the 
mobilization of collective actors. It plays a significant role in rule setting and in the 
monitoring of rule implementation. It has unmistakably shaped and transformed the  
preferences of many members in the process. And it certainly exerts a degree of social 
integration and control.  
 
The development of the Creative Commons community has to be seen in the context of the 
political and social controversies surrounding transnational copyright regulation as revealed, 
initially, through the TRIPS negotiations. Its organizational and framing strategy has been 
successful in the face of a much more resourceful opposition essentially because it resonated 
with widespread social practices of internet use. By addressing and mobilizing both, authors 
that have no or only a limited interest in the commercial exploitation of their creations and 
users of commons-based goods or file-sharing software they fostered the creation and 
expansion of a collectively experiences, transnational community of practice (Dobusch and 
Quack 2010b). By way of this shared self-image, they can be mobilized and because they 
daily use and champion the CC license, they in fact have a regulative impact.  Still, it remains 
to be seen to which extent the Creative Commons community, which evolved as a 
countermovement to a copyright coalition, will be able to exert equal impact in the area of 
commercial cultural production (see Elkin-Koren 2005). Currently, Creative Commons is 
generating fiercer opposition amongst copyright collecting agencies, i.e. private bodies 
established in different countries to collect royalty payments from various individuals and 
groups for established artists as copyright holders than within multimedia companies whose 
22 
advocacy campaigns address predominantly internet piracy
16
. Yet, Creative Commons is 
pursuing coordinated negotiations with copyright collecting agencies in different countries, 
the outcomes of which will be important for the further diffusion of its license. Overall, thus, 
the case study of the Creative Commons shows how a community of challenging civil society 
actors reached out to a wider constituency of actors from the public and private sector and, 
through organizational and framing strategies, built a collective identity for a mixed set of 
producers and users of internet content in the public domain.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
We have argued, in this paper, that the analysis of transnational communities provides a  
fruitful new perspective on the complex constituencies and dynamics of transnational standard 
setting. We define transnational communities as social groups emerging from interactions 
across national boundaries and bound together through mutual recognition and a common 
sense of belonging (Djelic and Quack 2010). We have argued that those transnational 
communities contribute to standard setting processes and hence have a significant impact 
when it comes to transnational governance. We have identified and explored different roles in 
that respect. Transnational communities, we propose facilitate the emergence of a 
transnational problem space and public arena. They foster collective mobilization, particularly 
of the kind cutting across different dividing lines – public and private, transnational and 
national, “regulators” and “regulatees”. We also underscored the potential role of 
transnational communities when it comes to the launching of standard setting projects. 
Transnational communities, we argued, help shape and transform the preferences of their 
members, with partial alignment through time as a consequence. Finally, transnational 
communities unmistakably exert social control in a more or less formal way. 
 
Our two case studies differed from each other in significant ways along the three dimensions 
identified above – goals and power, mode of access and nature of actors. On the one hand, the 
ICN case pointed to an elite top down pattern where powerful public agencies strove to enlist 
and mobilize others around an existing standard. The Creative Commons case reflected a 
more grassroots pattern of community development led by private and civil society actors 
with the project to develop an alternative or challenger standard. We hypothesized that each 
of these types of community development patterns might have specific strengths and 
                                                   
16
 http://governancexborders.com/2010/06/27/declaring-war-on-free-culture-collecting-
society-confronts-creative-commons/ [accessed: 25 April 2011] 
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weaknesses. The two cases studied in this paper illustrate this quite nicely. They also show 
that, in each case, the community came to deploy complementary strategies. In spite of clear 
differences, transnational communities came to perform through time strikingly similar roles 
in those two cases. This suggests that we should explore the developmental trajectories of 
different communities rather than simply doing static comparisons. In time, the elite ICN 
community has come to open up in a selective and controlled manner with a view to connect 
with certain important stakeholders in the private business and academic spheres mostly. In 
parallel, the challenger and grassroots based Creative Commons came to differentiate from 
within in order to deal with an increasing internal heterogeneity.  
 
A systematic comparison of the enlisting and challenging types of transnational community 
has allowed us to underscore what community dynamics add to the operation of organizations 
and networks engaged in standard setting and how those dynamics could intentionally or 
unintentionally feedback on formal organizations and networks. This systematic comparison 
has also suggested the contribution of cognitive and cultural factors to the stabilization and 
institutionalization of transnational standards. Naturally, the concrete ways in which the 
communities in each case fulfilled those parallel roles differed in part. The ICN tended to 
privilege peer pressure and inclusivity pressure as mechanisms of socialization. The Creative 
Commons, on the other hand, was better characterized by the use of modelling as a strategy 
aiming at persuasion and learning. Another difference was quite striking at the start but, 
interestingly, did come to whither away in part through time. Initially, the ICN strove to 
impose general standards to be adopted locally. The Creative Commons by contrast fostered 
diversity in the local adaptation of a general standard. Yet, as the ICN community became 
through time more aware of and reflexive about the limits of convergence, it moved towards a 
philosophy of “informed divergence” that included quite a bit of room for local adaptation. In 
parallel, as the Creative Commons community came to realize that too many jurisdictional 
variants of their licenses could create undesirable compatibility and convertibility problems, 
they amplified the promotion of the generic licenses. Hence, the initial differences in 
philosophy between our two cases appear to be diminishing over time. Whether this is also 
true of differences in terms of socialization mechanisms remains an open question to be 
explored in further studies. To test this empirically would call for a different research design 
and different data gathering methods. Equally, it would be interesting to explore whether 
enlisting elite communities constituted of business actors exhibit the same kinds of features 
24 
and dynamics as those characteristic of the ICN, which is made of public or quasi-public 
regulatory agencies. 
 
Finally, while the systematic comparison of our two cases underscored the importance of 
transnational communities in the ongoing process of transnational governance through 
standard setting, it also, we propose, pointed to the potential significance of a reverse impact. 
As transnational standard setting is deployed and developed, the networks, organizations and 
individuals involved increasingly come to exhibit community features and properties. The 
exploration of this proposition, again, would call for an extension of our research design and 
for now, this remains an interesting but tentative proposition.   
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